When warring parties in intrastate conflicts agree to negotiate an end to their conflict, they often face a range of impediments to success. The government may have to overcome its own constituents’ fear that peace negotiations represent a weakness; the insurgents must overcome fears that the talks could provide their adversary breathing space to reinitiate hostilities; and a host of exogenous shocks, such as economic downturns, political scandals, and violent attacks, must be managed and mitigated.
Moreover, the peace process may be jeopardized by spoilers – leaders that seek to undermine the talks or derail their outcome. For example, the Colombian peace process faced an influential coalition that included rural landowning and cattle-ranching elites, sections of the military, and a number of legislators, all of whom feared the impact of a final agreement on their interests (Bouvier 2013). In Northern Ireland, unionists and republicans both ran for president with the explicit objective of derailing the talks, though they ultimately failed to do so (Arenas 2014).
The extent to which these obstacles can be overcome depends largely on the negotiation framework adopted by the government. This article explores the impact of different inclusion arrangements, focusing on whether and how much the legal status of the negotiations, how the public is informed about the discussions, and how broad the range of domestic and international actors participating in the process will influence power dynamics at play.